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CAN PHYSICS EVER BE COMPLETE IF THERE IS NO FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL IN NATURE?
DISCUSSION NOTE ON LADYMAN & ROSS’S BOOK EVERY THING MUST GO.
ABSTRACT
In their recent book Every Thing Must Go Ladyman and Ross (Ladyman et al. 2007) claim:
 (1)  Physics is analytically complete since it is the only science that 
  cannot be left incomplete (cf. Ladyman et al. 2007, 283).
 (2)  There might not be an ontologically fundamental level (cf. Ladyman et al. 
  2007, 178).
 (3) We should not admit anything into our ontology unless it has 
  explanatory and predictive utility (cf. Ladyman et al. 2007, 179).
In this discussion note I aim to show that the ontological commitment in (3) implies that the 
completeness of no science can be achieved where no fundamental level exists. Therefore, if claim 
(1) requires a science to  actually be complete in order to be considered as physics, (1), and if Ladyman 
and Ross’s “tentative metaphysical hypothesis […] that there is no fundamental level” (178) is true, 
(2), then there simply is no physics. Ladyman and Ross can, however, avoid this unwanted result if 
they merely require physics to ever strive for completeness rather than to already be complete.
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DISCUSSION NOTE
In what follows, I will first go through statements (1)-(3) in detail and then, second, show that 
there’s some friction between them. Third, I suggest how this friction can be avoided.
Statement (1) that “physics is analytically complete since it is the only science that cannot 
be left incomplete” summarises the views expressed on page 283 of Ladyman and Ross’s 
book1 where analytic completeness can be further characterised as follows:
Completeness. For physics to be complete means that the (law) statements of physics hold 
omni-temporally and omni-spatially, everywhere at any time: “the generalizations of […] 
physics are exceptionless”, “any measurement taken anywhere in the universe is a potential 
counterexample to them.” (Ladyman et al. 2007, 283)
Analyticity of completeness. Moreover, this (alleged) completeness of physics is no mere 
fancy which can easily be given up in case it seems difficult or impossible to achieve. On the 
contrary, there is a demand that further research must be done should exceptions to a physical 
generalisation occur and, whatever the causes for the exceptions, they have to be incorporated 
and captured by a further advanced physical theory. Should (alleged) physicstoday not be 
complete then physicstomorrow must be in order to be physics proper. Ladyman and Ross call this 
“an institutional norm justified by appeal to the history of science.” (Ladyman et al. 2007, 
283). They back up their claim by quoting Earman and Roberts: “It is the goal of physicists to 
find such strict, proviso free laws […]. When exceptions are found to the candidates for 
fundamental physical laws […] the search is on for new candidates.” (Earman et al. 1999: 446)
While it is fairly clear what “completeness” means, it remains slightly ambiguous how we 
shall interpret its analyticity. Taken in its orthodox reading, analyticity of completeness should 
mean that a science has to be complete in order to be considered to be physics proper: no 
completeness, no physics. Yet, Ladyman and Ross’s writings suggest also a softer reading 
where “analytic completeness” indicates more a methodological aim rather than an essential 
conceptual requirement: physics is the (one and only)2  science that shall always strive for 
completeness.
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1  The formulation “analyticity of completeness” cannot be found explicitly in Ladyman and Ross’s book. I 
borrow  it from Ladyman’s recent conference presentations where he uses it as an adequate summary of page 
238.
2  Note aside that the analyticity of completeness is not only seen as a virtue of physics in isolation but it is also 
meant to tell physics from other sciences which do not share this feature: the generalizations of chemistry, 
biology, empirical psychology, etc. need not be exceptionless. Potential counterexamples to generalizations of 
those sciences might well be explained by reference to underlying levels not belonging to the scope of these 
sciences: physical damage to the brain might, for example, explain the loss of  some mental capacity.
In what follows, I will show that the latter but not the former interpretation is coherent 
with the other two claims, (2) & (3), from above. For that purpose I adopt, for now, the 
stronger reading. The upshot is then, in short, that physics can’t be complete if there is no 
fundamental level in nature (an outcome that is, I hope, valuable also independent of 
Ladyman and Ross’s book).
Before I turn to a closer examination of the second claim, (2), note that in their book 
Ladyman and Ross actually speak of “fundamental” where I have, in (1), used the term 
“complete”. For example, they write: “By ‘fundamental’ physics [= ‘complete physics’ in my 
terminology, MS] we will refer to that part of physics about which measurements taken 
anywhere in the universe carry information.” (Ladyman et al. 2007, 55).
However, “complete” (as used here) is the more adequate term because we need to 
distinguish “fundamental = complete” from Ladyman and Ross’s second and different use of 
“fundamental” as ontologically basic. In that latter sense, “fundamental” refers to an ontological 
rock bottom level, to, so to speak, the atoms of atomism (in the original meaning of atomos). 
In other words, where completeness is a feature of scientific theories, i.e., of abstract entities 
used by epistemic subjects as predictive and explanatory devices, fundamentality is a feature of 
worlds: a world has, ontologically speaking, a fundamental level if this level has no underlying 
substructure.
This brings us straight to claim (2): the thesis put forward by Ladyman and Ross is that 
our world has no such fundamental level. The authors believe, on inductive grounds, that the 
world is ontologically endlessly complex: “We have inductive grounds for denying that there is 
a fundamental level since every time one has been posited, it has turned out not to be 
fundamental after all.” (178; my italics). The history of science teaches us that once postulated 
“atomic” entities turned out to have sub-structures. Atoms divided into electrons, protons and 
neutrons, the latter further into quarks, and, maybe, string theory has yet another story to tell 
about a deeper, more fundamental structure. This might go on forever: “there might not be a 
fundamental level”, rather, there might be an endless “Russian Doll” cascade of infinitely 
many levels (where any whole has parts that all have further proper parts).
I turn to claim (3). The almost neo-positivist or verificationist demand, (3), of Every thing 
must go that “we should not admit anything into our ontology unless it has explanatory and 
predictive utility” must hold for ontological levels as well. That is, for any given ontological 
level we shall postulate a deeper (more fundamental) level only if its postulation contributes to a 
theory’s predictive or explanatory power. Stipulating a causally, predictively, explanatory idle 
underlying level would be what Ladyman and Ross call “pointless”: this level would not make 
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a “contribution to objective inquiry” (cf. Ladyman et al. 2007, 30; also cf. their Principle of 
Naturalistic Closure (PNC) on 37-8).
We can now put together (1)-(3). Ladyman and Ross came to believe, (2), that there are 
infinitely many levels on inductive grounds and not, in the first place, because the stipulation 
of these levels has explanatory or predictive power. However, if this belief is to be coherent 
with their neo-positivist demand (3) that “we should not admit anything into our ontology 
unless it has explanatory and predictive utility”, they have to assume, also, that without the 
postulation of the existence of those many ontological levels, plus the respective lawlike 
generalisations, physics (at any level) would leave some phenomena unexplained and 
unforeseen. Yet, unforeseen and, especially, unexplained phenomena are, perceived from the 
viewpoint of an experimental, empirical science, nothing but “measurements taken 
somewhere in the universe that constitute counterexamples” to that science, i.e., the 
generalizations of that science would not be exceptionless and so it would, contra (1), not be 
complete.
Put in the form of a dilemma, either science/physics stops at some level then some 
phenomena are left unexplained, or physics doesn't stop in which case it becomes an infinite 
endeavour. In any case, any concrete allegedly fundamental physical theory at any point in time 
is not actually complete. So, if we read the methodological requirement of completeness in its 
strongest sense and “physics”, properly so called, must actually be complete then no human 
science ever qualifies as physics.3
Here’s a suggestion: if we adopt the softer reading, introduced above, where 
completeness is a methodological aim rather than an essential conceptual requirement (i.e., 
completeness in its aspiration rather than in actuality) then physics can be rescued like 
Goethe’s hero Faust: redeemed from his endless quest to find “what it is that girds the world 
together in its inmost being” the angels welcome Faust in heaven with the words: “Him can 
we save that tirelessly strove ever to higher level“. Where no inmost being girds the world 
together, also physics can be saved if it tirelessly strives ever to higher level instead of having to be 
complete already.
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3  I leave it an open question whether there is the following metaphysical possibility for completeness despite 
endless complexity: it might be that from a certain level onwards the underlying levels are structurally perfectly 
alike the ones above, endlessly. In that case, physics could be completed by, so to speak, adding a clause “and so 
on, over and over again”. It is, however, doubtful whether we would ever be able to know  whether this possibility 
is actualised.
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